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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STArrE OF UTAH 
ROY D. THATCHER, LEROY B. YOUNG 
and P A "GL THATCHER, co-partners, doing 
business under the firm name and style of 
THATCHER & YOUNG, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, and BERNICE Y. 
ROSENBAUl\I, for herself as a widow, and 
also as the mother of JOAN B. ROSEN-
BAUM and ELYNOR K. ROSENBAUM, the 
minor daughters of :MORRIS DEW AYNE 
ROSENBAUl\tf, deceased, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendants. 
The plaintiffs are and at all times herein mentioned 
were attorneys at law duly licensed by this court to 
practice their profession throughout the State of Utah. 
In February, 1946 one Morris Dewayne Rosenbaum 
died of injuries resulting from an accident occuring in 
the course of his employment by one H. ll,ay Sholty. 
Shortly thereafter his widow filed with the Industrial 
Commission an application in her own behalf and in that 
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of her minor daughters, claiming workmen's compen-
sation as provided by law. At that time the widow 
was advised by a member of the Industrial Commission 
that it would not be necessary for her to retain counsel 
to represent her at the hearing upon her application, 
but that the Commission would give her a fair hearing 
and make such order as she was entitled to without the 
expense of counsel. However, upon the hearing, the 
Industrial Commission found that the decedent was 
not the employee of Sholty, and entered an order 
denying any compensation. 
The widow thereupon consulted with the plaintiffs 
herein. At that time she had no money to pay them a 
fee. It was recognized that to obtain a reversal of the 
Industrial Commission's order in view of the record 
made at the hearing and the presumptions in favor 
of the correctness of the Commission's order would be 
a very difficult legal task requiring a high degree of 
legal skill, and that any fee to be paid plaintiffs for 
their services would have to be contingent upon the 
successful performance of this task. Accordingly the 
widow retained the plaintiffs as her attorneys to ob-
tain a review of the decision of the Commission upon 
a reasonable fee to be agreed upon and paid them only 
in the event that plaintiffs' efforts in behalf of the 
claimants should result in the making of an award of 
workmen's compensation to the widow and children of 
the decedent. 
The plaintiffs, as attorneys for the dependants of 
the decedent, filed before the Industrial Commission 
their application for rehearing, which was denied. 
Plaintiffs then briefed very carefully all the questions 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
involved and procured the issuance in due course of 
a writ of certiorari to the Industrial Commission for 
the review of its order denying compensation, and after 
further careful briefing· wrote and submitted their brief, 
read the brief of the respondents and the authorities 
cited therein, and argued the case before the Supreme 
Court in Salt Lake City. The Supreme Court, in a 
divided opinion, set aside the order of the Industrial 
Co!Illllission denying compensation. Rosenbaum v. In-
dustrial Com mission, Utah, 185 Pac. 2d 511. Thereupon 
the respondents in that case filed a brief arguing that 
the matter should be reheard, but failed to file any 
petition for rehearing. 
After briefing the question involved in the respon-
dents' failure to file a petition with their brief, the 
plaintiffs herein, as counsel for the widow, filed a 
motion for the issuance of a remittitur. Thereupon 
the respondents in that case filed a motion to be relieved 
of their default and sought leave to file the petition for 
rehearing. Both motions were argued before the· court 
in chambers and submitted, and the motion of the 
widow was denied and the motion of the respondents 
therein was granted and an order made allowing them 
to file their petition for rehearing. The brief on the 
application for rehearing was then read and studied by 
the plaintiffs and a reply brief prepared and filed. The 
petition for rehearing was denied by the court. The 
various proceedings are outlined in some detail in the 
petition for the .writ in this case. 
Thereafter the plaintiffs and their client discussed 
the matter of a fee and it was agreed between them that 
One Thousand Dollars ( $1,000.00) was a reasonable con-
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tigent fee to be paid them for their successful services 
and plaintiffs' client agreed to pay that fee. This 
agreement was reported by letter to the Industrial 
Commission upon the request of the chairman. In the 
meantime the remittitur had issued from the Supreme 
. Court, and based upon the Court's ruling and the facts 
in the case, the Commission vacated its previous order 
denying compensation and entered an order awarding 
to the dependents of the decedent compensation totaling 
Seven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($7,250.00). 
At the same time the Commission entered an order 
fixing the fees of plaintiffs for their services to their 
clients at Three Hundred Seventy Five Dollars (375.00) 
and directing that that sum be paid to them directly out 
of the compensation awarded. (R. 75.) 
No notice was given to plaintiffs that their contract 
with their client was to be set aside and the fee reduced, 
and no opportunity was given them to be heard upon 
the issues involved in such order or to present evidence 
in support of their contract, nor did the Commission 
hear any competent evidence regarding such fee as a 
basis for its order in respect thereto. All these things 
appear from the record certified to this court. 
Thereupon the plaintiffs herein filed with the In-
dustrial Commission their application for a rehearing 
and the application was denied, and the application for 
the writ of review herein followed in due course. 
The plaintiffs' client still remains ready, willing 
and anxious to pay to plaintiffs the One Thousand 
Dollar ($1,000.00) fee agreed upon. 
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In thi8 connection and before proceeding further, 
we desire to advise the court that at the time the appli-
cation for a rehearing was filed herein and again at the 
time the 'Writ was issued by this court, the plaintiffs 
advised their client Mrs. Rosenbaum that insofar as the 
matter of the fee was concerned, she was an adverse 
party to the plaintiffs herein and that we could not 
advise her but that she was entitled to and should seek 
other counsel and that she was perfectly free to oppose 
any attempt to set aside or reYise the order of the Com-
mission respecting the fees of the plaintiffs for legal 
services rendered to her. She, however, felt that she 
had made a reasonable bargain and she wanted to per-
form it, and joined in the application to the Industrial 
Commission for a rehearing. We have not been advised 
whether she has in fact consulted other counsel since 
the writ was issued in this case. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The plaintiffs assign and rely upon the following 
errors committed by the Industrial Commission for a 
reversal of the order of the Commission fixing plaintiffs' 
fees for legal services rendered their client at Three 
Hundred Seventy Five Dollars (375.00): 
1. The Industrial Commission erred and acted in 
excess of its jurisdiction in entering its order of January 
29, 1948 fixing the attorneys' fees of plaintiffs herein. 
2. The Industrial Commission erred and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously and in excess of its juris-
diction in fixing the attorneys' fees of plaintiffs herein 
at a sum less than the amount plaintiffs' client had 
agreed to pay without first giving plaintiffs notice, and 
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an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence upon 
issues fairly drawn, and without hearing or taking any 
evidence upon which to base its order fixing such fees. 
3. The Industrial Commission erred and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in fixing plaintiffs' fees at 
Three Hundred Seventy Five Dollars ($375.00) and in 
failing to approve plaintiffs' contract for fees to be paid 
in the sum of One Thousand Dollars (1,000.00); 
4. The Industrial Commission erred and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying plaintiffs' appli-
cation for rehearing of the matter of the Commission's 
order respecting attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
Our first three assignments of error address them-
selves, in order, to the following three propositions: 
1. Section 42-1-81 U.C.A., 1943, purporting to 
authorize the Commission to regulate and fix attorneys' 
fees is unconstitutional and void as an unwarranted 
legislative and executive interference with the judicial 
branch of the government in violation of Article V, 
Section 1 of the Constitution of U tab. 
2. Said Section and the orders of the Commission 
thereunder are also unconstitutional and void because 
the statute authorizes the Commission to regulate and 
fix, and the Commission has in fact reduced and fixed 
the fees of attorneys, and particularly the plaintiffs, for 
their services without notice or opportunity to be heard 
or to present evidence in an orderly proceeding, thus 
depriving plaintiffs of property without due process of 
law and denying equal pdotection of the law in violation 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Section 1, Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the 
United States and Anicle I, Section 7 of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
3. EYen if the statute is valid, still the Commission, 
under the facts, acted so arbitrarily, capriciously and 
unreasonably in refusing to approve the agreed fee of 
$1,000, and in fixing such fees at the unreasonably low 
sum of $375 that it has abused its discretion, and this 
court will correct that abuse. 
Our fourth assignment of course embraces the first · 
three, for if the commission erred in any one of the three 
points first assigned, it erred in failing to gTant a re-
hearing to correct those errors. These matters will be 
discussed in order. 
Point 1. The Commission is without jurisdicUon 
to fix plaintiffs' fees beca1tse the statute purporting to 
grant that jurisdiction is a void attempt of the legis-
lature to authorize an executive commission to invade 
the judicial prerogative by regulating the conduct of 
attorneys as officers of the court. 
So far as we have been able to ascertain this is the 
first time this question has been raised here or in any 
other state having a statute similar to our section 42-
1-81, U.C.A., 1943. Apparently no constitutional question 
was submitted to or considered by this court in Ellis 
vs. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432, 64 Pac. 2d 363 
or In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 Pac. 2d 961, the two 
previous cases in which the statute bas been involved. 
Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides that 
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''The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise 
of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions apper-
taining to either of the others, except in the cases 
herein expressly directed or permitted.'' 
The Industrial Commission, of course, is a creature 
of the legislature, an executive or administrative body 
without power to perform judicial acts or to exercise 
· judicial functions. 
Logan City vs. Industrial Commission, 
85 U. 131, 38 Pac. 2d 769 
Attorneys, including the plaintiffs herein, are off-
icers of the court-of the judicial branch of the govern-
ment of U tab. 
This Court, in the case of 
Ruckenbrod vs. Mullins, 
102 Utah 548, 133 Pac. 2d 325, 
144 A.L.R. 839, 
in its most illuminating opinion, reviewed the history 
of the development of the judiciary as an independent 
branch of government and of the role of the attorney 
in the judicial system. As the Court there says '' Today 
our judicial procedure is such that the attorney is 
indispensable.'' The right to counsel in litigation is 
granted by Article I, Section 11, of our State Consti-
tution. Only the most general knowledge of our es-
tablished procedure is necessary to arrive at the ines-
capable conclusion that the office of the attorney plays 
an integral and absolutely essential, an "indispensable" 
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role in the administration of justice by the udiciary 
of Utah. Without the attorney the wheels of justice 
would become clogged and would grind to a stop. 
It follows that any action which militates against 
the free and effective functioning of the attorney in the 
discharge of the duties of his office strikes at the roots 
of the judicial system itself. For this reason if for no 
other, it is the general rule that the admission of attor-
neys to the bar, the regulation of their professional con-
duct, and their discipline and disbarment are judicial 
functions and powers which are inherent in the Court. 
As this Court said in Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, supra, ''To 
properly function it is necessary that courts retain 
control of their officers.'' 
As the Court recognized in its opinion in the Rucken-
brod case, the legislature may make reasonable regula-
tions in aid of the power of the courts to control their 
attorney-officers but the ultimate power must be and 
is inherently in the courts. This rule has. the widest 
acceptance. Its application is well stated by the An-
notator in an extensive note dealing with admissions to 
the bar (144 A.L.R. 150) as. follows: 
"Under most constitutions the sounder and better 
supported doctrine seems to be· that, in the exer-
cise of its police power, in the interest and for the 
protection of the general public, a legislature may, 
with entire validity, reasonably regulate admis-
sions to the bar, but that any statutory provision 
which, as put into effect, involves interference 
with, or frustration of the courts in the perform-
aliCe of their duties and ftmctions cannot be re-
garded as valid." (Italics added) 
9 
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That is the effect of the rule announced by this court 
for this state in the case of 
In re Platz 
42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 390, 392, 
which was quoted with approval in the Ruckenbrod case. 
See also 
In re Unification of :Montana Bar Association, 
87 Pac. 2d 172. 
An excellent headnote by Carter, J., of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, in the case 
reads 
In re Integration of Nebraska State 
Bar Association, 
133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151, 
"The Supeme Court has the inherent power to 
regulate the conduct and qualifications of attor-
neys as officers of the court. The proper adminis-
tration of justice is the main business of a court, 
and whatever obstructs or embarrasses its chief 
function must naturally be under its control. The 
practice of law is so intimately connected and 
bound up with the exercise of judicial power in 
the administration of justice that the right to 
define and regulate its practice naturally and 
logically belongs to the judicial department of 
our state government.'' 
In a very well considered case the Nebraska Court 
has also held that, in absence of express grant by the 
Constitution to the legislature, the power to regulate 
the practice of law is vested in the eourts, and that 
consequently a statute providing that any Nebraska 
10 
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law school should be deemed "approved" so that its 
graduates are entitled to take the bar examination is 
unconstitutional and void as an unwarranted encroach-
ment upon the judicial prerogative. See 
State ex rei. Ralston v. Turner 
4 N.W. 2d 302, 1-l:-! A. L. R. 138 
See also the case of 
In re Fletcher 
107 F. ~d 666, 668, cert. den. 309 U.S. 664, 
in which the lTnited States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia says 
"It is held by the great weight of authority that 
it is within the inherent power of courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction to define and regulate the prac-
tice of law and that this power includes the · 
control of practice not only in the court, but also 
outside. See Opinion of the Justices, 1935, 289 
l.Iass. 607, 194 N.E. 313; Judd v. City Trust & 
Savings Bank, 1937, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. 2d 
288; Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile 
Service Association, 1935, 55 R. I. 122, 179 A. 139, 
100 A. L. R. 226; In re l\1:orse, 1924, 98 Vt. 85, 126 
A. 550, 36 A.L.R. 527. '' 
In this case a disbarred attorney was held guilty 
of contempt for sending a letter representing that he 
was authorized to practice law. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has considered 
these principles in its very well reasoned opinion in the 
case of 
!\[eunier v. Bernich 
170 So. 567. 
11 
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That was an action by a "claim adjuster" upon a 
written contract solicited by the plaintiff' whereby he 
ep.gage<l to investigate, adjust and collect defendant's 
claim for the negligent death of their child for one-third 
of the proceeds, under a statute specifically authorizing 
a lay person to perform such services provided he does 
so without resort to court proceedings. It was held 
that such services constitute unauthorized practice of 
law, that regulation of the practice of law is an ex-
clusively judicial function, and that the statute was un-
constitutional as an impingement on the exclusive pre-
rogative of the judicial branch under the section. of 
the Constitution dividing the government into three 
branches. The contract for employment was therefore 
illegal and void. The Court's reasoning is so well stated 
we feel constrained to quote at some length from the 
opnnon. 
The Court says : 
"Due to the fact that courts are not impowered 
to enact laws, the jurisprudence has approved 
legislation passed in aid of the courts' inherent 
powers. But, while such statutes, in aid of the 
courts' powers will be sanctioned, by the same 
token, the courts disapprove and render valueless 
any legislation, which has the effect of divesting 
or stripping its inherent powers ... 
''It is therefore manifest that the Supreme Court 
not only possesses the inherent power to prescribe 
the ultimate qualifications for those who wish to 
engage in the practice of law, but this prerogative 
necessarily includes the regulation of the law 
practice. The legislature may aid, by the passage 
of statutes, the exertion of judicial power sub-
ject to the approval of the court. And, albeit, 
12 
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while the Leg-islature may enact laws to aid the 
courts in the protection of its inherent power, 
the courts will suppress and disapprove statues, 
such ns the exception contained in section 2, ... 
which frustrate and stultify that implied judicial 
authority ... 
• 'lJ nuer the Constitution, the Supreme Court is 
giYen express power to regulate the conduct of 
the members of the bar. When the legislature 
passes a statute which attempts to define the 
practice of law, it directly impinges upon the 
constitutional grant of power bestowed upon 
the courts respecting the regulation of the con-
duct of the members of the legal profession. 
"If a lawyer solicits business, as Meunier has 
done in this case, he can be brought before the 
Supreme Court and tried for his misconduct in 
office. .Meunier, however, acting in his capacity 
as an adjuster, ... is, by authority of the ex-
ception, privileged to do all things that a qualified 
lawyer might do in the practice of law, save 
appearance in Court, without being subject t9 
the discipline of or regulation by the court and 
wholly unrestrained by any consideration of the 
ethical standards of the profession. This type 
of statute has the effect of nullifying the power 
vested in the Supreme Court to punish those 
persons, who engage in the practice of law with-
out a license ... 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that attor-
neys customarily handling damage suits do so on 
a contingent fee basis. The fee of the attorney 
iH fixed on a percentage of the amount recovered 
in court and in almost all cases, the percentage 
of the attorne~v's interest in the outcome of the 
litigation is higher than that received by him in 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
other· case.s because he is not compensated for his 
services in the .event he fails to obtain a 
judgment.'' 
''T.he rendering of legal services before an adminis-
trative tribunal, such as the Industrial Commission, is 
the practice of law, and the power of the courts to dis-
: cipline and control attorneys extends to the field of such 
practice. Neither the legislature nor the administrative 
body which. it. has created has any power to authorize 
. persons not- duly-licensed. by the courts as attorneys at 
:law to =.engage in such practice. 
People .ex_rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n 
v. Goodman (Ill., 1937) 
-B'N.E. 2d 941, 111 A.L.R. 1 . 
. It would. seem obvious that if attorneys are officers 
. -of the judicial branch of the government, and absolutely 
essential to the discharge of the functions of that branch, 
:and· subject to ··regulation and ·control-by the courts in 
·the performance of their official duties, they must be 
:free-from hampering and fustrating control by the other 
branches of government. If they. are. not, the effective 
. function of the courts becomes subject to the arbitrary 
whim of. the legislature or the executive. This becomes 
apparent if·. we assume an extreme case. Suppose the 
legislature· were to enact a statute forbidding any attor-
ney to charge more than $10.00 for services before any 
·court in. any •. one case. Although attorneys are public 
-officers serving· in' the judicial branch of government, 
they· are ·not· paid any compensation out of the public 
'furids. (See :the.Ruckenbrod case, supra!) Neither does 
the l~gislatur~ proVide for them office space or pay other 
.expenses incident to their office. Attorneys are entirely 
dependent upon the fees paid them by their clients for 
14 
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legal services rendered. If they are forbidden to receive 
fair and adequate fee8 for legal services rendered they 
can neither maintain themselves (Attorneys, also, eat.) 
nor perform their functions before the courts. More-
over, some attorneys, as other human beings, if pre-
vented from receiving· a fair return for their services? 
thus being subjected to economic stress, will be 
tempted ahYays to amplify their incomes through im-
proper procedures, bringing the entire adminis-
tration of justice into disrepute and materially impairing 
the prestige and effectiveness of the courts. An apt illus-
tration may be found in the Utah Bar's unfortunate 
experience. 
In re Hatch, 
108 Utah 446, 160 Pac. 2d 961. 
Furthermore, as the earning capacity of, and public 
respect for attorneys is lowered, the bar attracts fewer 
and fewer men of ability and energy, and the functioning 
of the judicial branch of government is further hindered 
and impaired. 
And if, as here, a reasonable return for services 
is prevented only in one field of legal practice, that field 
tends to be neglected by capable and conscientious attor-
neys, until as a general rule, only the relatively incom-
petent practitioner, or the practitioner who refuses "to 
deliver more than he is paid for'' will accept employment 
in that field. Some very capable young men, newly 
called to the bar, will occasionally practice in that field 
during their ''starvation period,'' but ordinarily they 
withdraw as soon as they are able. 
Such is the case with workmen's compensation in 
Utah. We believe it is common knowledge that few of 
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the leading firms in Utah will, except under unusual 
conditions, accept employment from a claimant before 
the Industrial Commission. Such practice hardly pays 
its share of office overhead, not to mention a ''fair 
wage.'' 
It seems clear that the legislature's enactment of 
Section 42-1-81, U.C.A. 1943, and the arbitrary and 
capricious application thereof by the administrative 
Industrial Commission materially interferes with and 
frustrates the courts in the administration of justice and 
in the control and regulation of their officers pursuant 
to their exclusive prerogative. It is unconstitutional 
and void. 
Further strong support for this proposition is found 
Ill 
Ruckenbrod vs. Mullins 
102 Utah 548, 144 A.L.R. 839, 
hereinbefore referred to. It was there held that "The 
attorney, because of his position as an officer of the 
court, can be compelled by the court [not the legislature 
or the executive] to render gratuitous services in the 
defense of indigents ... " (Italics added.) The right 
to compensation for one's labor is a property right. 
McGrew vs. Industrial Commission 
96 Utah 203, 85 Pac. 2d 608. 
Such a right, of course, cannot be taken away without 
due process of law. The court, in the Ruckenbrod case, 
points out that the justification for a court order re-
quiring an attorney to defend an indigent without pay 
lies in the privileges incident to the office, in considera-
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tion of which (in effeet) the attorney, upon being called 
to the bar, ,·oluntarily submits himself to the jurisdic-
tion of the rourt to nwke such an order. He assumes the 
burdens \Yith the privileges of the office. 
Although commenting that in many states attorneys 
haYe saddled upon them most of the common law duties 
and obligations while many of the common law privi-
leges no longer exist, the court holds that attorneys 
still enjoy as privileg·es the exclusive right to set the 
judicial machinery in motion in behalf of another, the 
sponsorship of the courts as a person worthy of confid-
ence, the right (in some states) to be free of occupational 
tax, the right to hold office during good behavior, and 
freedom from control by the legislature in his official 
capacity. This court there observed, 
''This freedom from control by all except the 
courts in ·which they are officers is deemed a 
privilege. '' 
We submit that the Ruckenbrod case is controlling 
here. It is a direct holding that attorneys are exempt 
from legislative control in their practice of the law. 
They are. subject only to the plenary power of the 
courts. 
Any statute encroaching on that power and in-
fringing the privilege is void. 
It is true that courts have, as a matter of inter-
departmeut::d comity, sometimes recognized, or adopted 
and enforced reasonable statutory regulations where they 
have been in aid of the court's power. This is perhaps 
analogous to the well known rule that ceretain aspects 
of interstate commerce are subject to state regulation 
17 
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until the Federal government has assumed its exclusive 
prerogative in the regulated area. It is equally analo-
gous to the equally well known rule that when Congress 
has taken any action within the regulated field, all 
previous state regulations immediately determine and 
have no effect. See 
11 Am. J ur. '' Commerce'' Sections 22 to 24. 
Thus the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the 
very reeent case of 
In re Berkwitz, 
80 N.E. 2d 45 
held that a statute relating to admission of attorneys 
to the bar was void because it dealt with subject matter 
regulated by court rule adopted under the court's ex-
clusive power under the Constitution, even though the 
statute had, previous to the adoption of the court rule, 
been aecepted by the court as in aid of its jurisdiction. 
That is the situation in Utah. Prior to the adoption 
by this court of the Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar, the court, without conceding the 
legislature any plenary right to regulate the conduct 
of attorneys (See In re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 
390) nevertheless recognized legislative enactments in 
that field which were in aid of the court's jurisdiction. 
However, it is noteworthy that when the Court, on 
March 1, 1937, adopted the Rules of Conduct, it deemed 
it necessary to incorpora.te the existing sta.tutes irn the 
Rules themselve.-; . .. This was done in Rule II. Evidently 
the Court and the officers serving it recognized that 
unless so preserved the statutes would cease to be 
effective from the moment the Court assumed to exer-
cise its authority by rule. 
18 
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It i~ also noteworthy that this Court, in adopting 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, declared that it did 
so '• under the inherent power of the Court to control 
and supervise the conduct of members of the Utah 
State Bar." \Ye think it is also fair to observe that 
these Rules of Conduct are well loaded with burdens 
which the attorney assumes, and which should be re-
garded as more than ample consideration for the privi-
lege for which we here contend. 
The Court, in adopting the statutory rules of con-
duct, did not adopt section 42-1-81, under which the 
Industrial Commission claims jurisdiction. It is to be 
doubted that the Court could constitutionally so delegate 
its power to an administrative body, at least without 
prescribing policies, standards and rules for its guid-
ance, and a procedure according due process and the 
right to review by the Court. See 
16 C.J.S. p. 507, note 62, et seq. 
Instead of delegating the supervision of its attorneys 
in the matter of fees to the Industrial Commission, the 
Court itself prescribed the principles to , govern . the 
fixing of the fee (Rule III, Section 32, paragraph 12.) 
and provided for the discipline of attorneys who should 
violate the provisions of the rule. 
Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. 
In so doing this Court pre-empted the field in which 
it has inherent and, under the constitution, exclusive 
power and jurisdiction. Any authority which the legis-
lature and its creature, the Industrial Commission, may 
have previously had under rules of inter-departmental 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
comity thereupon immediately ceased and determined. 
Attorneys' fees in compensation cases, at least since 
then, have been the subject of open and free agreement 
between the parties concerned. 
This of course does not mean that claimants are at 
the mercy of unscrupulous attorneys who may exact 
unconscienable fees from them. It is, we believe, com-
con knowledge that under the Rules of Discipline the 
State Bar Commission and its committees, as the auth-
orized agency of the Court, has in fact heard and de-
termined all charges made before them of the charging 
of unfair fees or of over reaching by attorneys. More-
over, in cases of obvious abuse the courts have and exer-
cise summary power to compel their attorneys to refund 
moneys exacted from their clients. 
Re Long 
287 N.Y. 449, 40 N.E. 2d 247, 141 A.L.R. 651 
Shima v. Shima 
139 Fed. 2d 533, 150 A.L.R. 1179 
It is submitted that section 42-1-81, U.C.A., 1943, 
as put into effect and administered by the Industrial 
Commission interferes with and frustrates the courts 
and their officers in the performance of their duties 
and functions, is an unjustified and unwarranted en-
croachment on the judicial branch of government, and 
is therefore unconstitutional and void. The order of 
the Commission in this case of course falls with the 
statute. 
Point II. The statute in question, and the procedure 
and order of the Commission thereunder are void for 
violation of Section 1, Amendment XIV of the Const,i· 
tution of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
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At the outset it is perhaps well briefly to call the 
court's attention to one phase of this aspect of the case 
which is closely related to the matters discussed under 
Point I. It i~ the rule that administrative proceedings 
conducted under statutory authority do not constitute 
due process of law unless the procedure and power of 
decision committed to the administrative body is within 
the power of the legislature to confer. 
Dukich Ys. Blair 
3 Fed. 2d 302. 
This would seem to be elementary. As we have demon-
strated in our previous discussion, the power attempted 
to be exercised by the Commission in this case, as wielded 
by it, encroaches upon the judicial prerogative, and is 
not within the power of the legislature to bestow. Its 
attempted exercise by the Commission therefore de-
prives plaintiffs, and attorneys generally, of their pro-
perty without due process, and is unconstitutional and 
void. 
Again, even if it were to be conceded that the legis-
lature under our system may regulate, or delegate the 
regulation of the fees to be charged by attorneys for 
their services as officers of the judicial branch (which 
we do not), the legislature must still prescribe a policy, 
standard or rule for the Commission's guildance, and 
cannot vest it with an arbitrary or uncontrolled power 
with regard thereto, thus permitting an encroachment 
on the legislative prerogative. 
16 C.J.S., p. 349, note 12, 
and cases cited. 
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Statutes purporting to confer such power are invalid 
for the additional reason that they deny due process 
of law. 
Douglas vs. Noble, 
261 u. s. 165. 
Yet that is just what the legislature has attempted to 
do here. It has said that "the Commission is vested 
with full power to regulate and fix the fees of such 
attorneys.'' No policy, no standard, no rule for guid-
ance, or fixing reasonable limits, or even requiring the 
Commission to investigate and fix its own standards 
after reasonable notice and hearing. Nothing to suggest 
even that either the client or the attorney are entitled 
to notice and an opportunity to be heard before their 
rights and duties are fixed by the Commission. ,Just 
unlimited, arbitrary power, which this record shows the 
Commission has exploited to the fullest extent. Clearly 
this infringes the state and federal constitutions. 
We think that the arbitrary application of this as-
serted power by the Commission also deprives attorenys 
for claimants and their clients before the Commission of 
the equal protection of the law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In this 
case and other cases the Commission has fixed the fees 
of the attorneys for the claimant at notoriously low 
figures. Neither here, nor in any other case, so far 
as we know, has the Commission even attempted to fix 
the fees of counsel for the private insurance carrier. 
The latter is free to charge and collect a reasonable fee 
under the principles set out in the Court's Rules of Con-
duct. This certainly is an unfair and unreasonable dis-
crimination between the attorneys (who are surely in 
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the same class) a11d "·e belieYe it is equally unfair and 
unreasonable as bebYeen the parties. As we have 
pointed out, as a practical matter it prevents the 
claimant fron1 obtaining competent counsel of his own 
choice. At the Yery least it drastically limits his choice, 
and in many cases must result in the claimant relying 
upon counsel of relatiYely inferior ability in the presen-
tation of difficult facts and extremely nice points of 
law. While we realize that we are not here entitled to 
urge the discrimination against the claimant, it is still 
proper to mention the rna tter so that the Court may 
be cognizant of all of the background of the problem. 
And we do submit that the action of the Commission 
in this regard infringes the "equal protection" clause. 
See 12 Am. Jur. "Consti. Law" section 566. 
Even more serious, however, is the legislature's 
failure to require, and the Commission's failure to ac-
cord to plaintiffs herein the notice and opportunity to 
be heard before a competent tribunal in an orderly pro-
ceeding, which is the very essence of procedural ''due 
process.'' 
12 Am. Jur. "Consti-Law," section 573, p. 267. 
As the record shows, when plaintiffs re-
ported their agreement as to fees at the request 
of the Commission, the Commission, without no-
tice to plaintiffs or their client, without granting 
any opportunity to be heard, without tendering 
any Issues, or taking any evidence, and with-
out making any findings of fact, fixed plaintiffs 
fees for their services before the Court at a mere 3j8 of 
the reasonable fee upon which the parties concerned had 
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agreed. Then, further to demonstrate the arbitrary 
bias of the Commission, when this omission was called 
to its attention in the petition for rehearing (R. 78), it 
denied the petition and again refused to accord plain-
tiffs the essentials of due process. 
The right to receive compensation is, as before ob-
served, a property right. 
McGrew vs. Industrial Commission, 
supra. 
It is obviously immaterial, from a legal viewpoint, 
whether one is deprived of all or part of his property-
whether compensation is entirely denied or only re-
duced below an agreed fair return. A deprivation of 
property within the meaning of the constitution is in-
volved in either case, and cannot he legally accomplished 
without compliance with the constitutional requirements. 
This court has held that notice and an opportunity 
to be heard are elementary requirements of due process 
which cannot be refused in a proceeding before the In-
dustrial Commission, and an order made without ob-
servance of those fundamental rights is void. 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission 
74 Utah 316, 279 Pac. 612. 
The legislature specifically required (section 42-1-10, U. 
C.A. 1943) that the rules of the Commission provide for 
service of notice "in all claims for compensation," but 
the requirement of notice before depriving an attorney 
of a fair compensation is conspicuous only by its absence 
from the act. Nor has the Commission attempted by 
rule or practice to supply the deficiency, either because 
of a settled policy to discourage the appearance of 
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attorneys before it, or, perhaps, because it recognized 
the futility of an ad1ninistrative attempt to supply a 
legislative deficiency. 
For where a statute does not provide for notice and 
an opportunity to be heard it is unconstitutional and 
void, and it is immaterial that the agency in charge of 
its administration may in fact have accorded notice 
and such opportunity to one affected. 
People Ys. Broad ( Gen 'l. Motors Ace. Corp., 
Intervenor) 12 Pac. 2d 941. (California); 
cert. den. People v. General :Motors Ace. 
Corp., 287 U.S. 661. 
There are a number of interesting cases in which 
orders of Industrial Commissions fixing attorneys fees 
have been vacated for failure to follow the requirements 
of due process. In none of them has the enabling statute 
been attacked, as here, but they are nevertheless very 
instructive, and are exactly in point as regards the 
procedure here followed by the Commission. In 
Bentley vs. Industrial Ace. Commission, 
171 Pac. 2d 532 (Calif D. Ct. of App., 1946), 
certiorari was granted to review an order of the Com-
mission fixing attorneys fees in a compensation case. 
Because the attorney was not given a hearing the order 
was vacated, \vith instructions to grant a hearing and 
fix the fees on the basis of the evidence to be adduced. 
The court sets out some of the factors for consideration 
in fixing the fees and says : 
"If an award of attorney's fees was not to be 
based upon the facts which were known to the 
referee and the Commission, the attorney should 
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have been so advised, and should have been 
allowed an opportunity to offer evidence as to 
all matters property to be considered in fixing 
his fee. His petition for rehearing should have 
been granted. for that purpose.'' 
''We deem it important, however, that attor-
ney's fees in such matters should not be fixed 
with the sole purpose in view of saving the 
applicant from expense. The basis upon which 
fees are fixed should not be so low as to dis-
courage competent attorneys from accepting em-
ployment in industrial accident matters. Schilling 
vs Industrial Accident Commission, 47 Cal. .A.pp. 
190, 190 p. 373. '' 
From 
Conrad vs. State Industria] Commission, 
73 Pac. 2d 858 (Okl. 1937), 
We wish to quote the 2nd and 5th syllabi prepared by 
the court, and one short statement from the Court's 
opinion: 
'' 2. The claim for an attorney fee in a pro-
ceeding before the State Industrial Commission 
must be submitted to and heard by the Commis-
sion upon due notice to the parties affected there-
by pursuant to the requirements of due process of 
law.'' 
'' 5. In considering a claim for attorney's fees 
in a proceeding before it, the State Industrial 
Commission should be guided by the evidence 
concerning the services rendered and should ap-
prove such fee as may be just under all the cir-
cumstances and in consonance with right and 
justice between both the workman and the 
attorney.'' 
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ln its opinion the Court says: 
· · '1'i1e rig~lt of au at toruey to be paid for his 
sen·iees is a Yaluable one, and he cannot be made 
to acl'ep t an ex parte a\ntnl made therefor ... 
On the contrary the claim for such services must 
be ::;ubmitted to the Commission by the party 
entitled thereto and if not so submitted it cannot 
be heard by the Commission but when it has 
been so submitted, then the Commission must hear 
evidence in support thereof and in opposition 
thereto, and the Commission should show the 
attoruey the same cousid erat-ion it accords to the 
in.jured 1vorkman . . . In the award now under 
reYiew this was not done but the petitioner was 
given neither an opportunity to be present nor 
to offer any evidence in support of his claim, 
but the action of the Commission was apparently 
wholly ex parte. This constitutes a denial of 
due process of law guaranteed by section 7, 
Article 2, of the Constitution, and cannot be 
countenanced by this Court ... " (Italics added.) 
The companion cases of 
W arrenberg vs Cline, 
114 Pnc. 2d 302 (Colo. 1941), and 
Cline vs W arrenberg, 
126 Pac. 2d 1030, 
are very helpful. Both cases were appeals from judge-
ments iu a lmYer court in actions brought to review an 
order of the Industrial Commission fixing the fees of 
claimant's attorney in a compensation case. In the first 
case the Colorado Court held that the Industrial Com-' 
mission had acted arbitrarily in refusing the attorney 
a hearing on the question of the amount of the fees to 
be allowed the attorney for his services, and further, 
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that the trial court, on reYiew, had no authority to fix 
such fees in the absence of evidence and findings sup-
porting its order. The case was remanded with instruc-
tions to refer the matter to the Commission to hold 
hearings and to fix the fees in accordance with the 
principles outlined by the court as the proper basis for 
fees. 
After holding hearings as directed the Commission 
again fixed the fees of the Attorney, who again sought 
review by the Court. This was the second case above 
cited. The Court held that the legislative intent in the 
enactment of the statute authorizing the Commission to 
fix the fees of the attorney was to prevent attorneys 
from exacting excessive or unreasonable fees (a duty 
the Courts have assumed in Utah), and that the intent 
was not "to place the amount to be allowed as attorney's 
fees on such a low and unreasonable level as would 
foreclose a claimant from obtaining the legal services 
of competent counsel.'' The court continues, ''to arbi-
trarily deny a claimant the right of competent legal 
representation, by fixing unreasonably low remunera-
tion for services rendered by attorneys, is a serious 
matter, and may amount to a denial of due process. 
Preconceived ideas of the commissioners as to the 
value of legal services rendered in workmen's compen-
sation cases should not be permitted to override the 
sworn testimony of competent witnesses as to the 
value of those services in a given case.'' The court 
found that the Commission's allowance was unreason-
ably low, expressed its opinion as to a proper fee, and 
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent 
with its opinion. 
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And in the case of 
Employers Liability Assurance Uorp. 
v. Sims, '67 s.vv. 2d 445, 
the Texas Court had before it a case involving the fixing 
of attorney's fees in a workmen's compensation case. 
Apparently no issues had been made on the fee question. 
The court observes: 
~ • It is elementary that, in any case, no judge-
ment can be rendered, unless it be in response to 
proper pleading·s by one seeking the judgement; 
hence a proper pleading was necessary in respect 
to the allowance of an attorney fee, to warrant 
the court to fix a fee, and to enter judgement 
therefor.'' 
It is interesting to note that there the Texas Court 
allowed a fee of one-third of an award of $4,389.14. 
Apparently in Texas the legal servant is deemed worthy 
of his hire. 
We submit that the order of the Commission in the 
case at bar is void because it was entered without due 
process and because it denies the plaintiffs the equal 
protection of the law, and that the statute under which 
the Comm_ission purported to act is unconstitutional and 
void for denial of due process. 
Point III. Even if the Commission had author~ty 
to fix plaintiffs fees, in rejecting plaintiffs' contract 
for a fee of $1,000.00, and fixing a fee of only $375.00 
it acted arb,i,trarily and capriciously, and abused its dis· 
cretion, and the abuse will be corrected. 
It is difficult to argue this point, as a full argument 
would require full consideration of the facts, and the 
arbitrary action of the commission in refusing a hearing 
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has prevented the proper developmnet of the record to 
disclose all the facts and circumstances which make the 
fee allowed by the commission so unreasonably low. 
Quite frankly, we hesitated to make the statement of 
facts in this brief as full as we have, but on reflection 
' 
we concluded that the Commission's inclusion in the 
Record (pp. 67 to 73) of our letter of January 28, 1948, 
outlining the facts, justified us in so doing even though 
we beli~ve it is not competent evidence except as an 
admission by us that no more than $1000.00 was due for 
fees. Moreover, we think that inasmuch as this case 
is in effect a continuation of the case of Rosenbaum v. 
Industrial Commission, No. 7021, ................ Utah ................ ,' 
185 Pac. 2d 511, in this court, the court may here take 
judicial notice of the proceedings before this court which 
form the basis for the agreement for a $1000.00 fee. 
Moreover, the presiding officers of this court are 
attorneys, and although perhaps somewhat cloistered 
as regards active practice and the matter of fees during 
the term of their judicial service they have and are en-
titled to have judicial opionions on the reasonableness 
of legal fees, as they did in Ellis vs Industrial Com-
mission, 91 Utah 432. 
And see 
In re Associated Towel & Linen Supply Co. 
7 F. S. 699. 
The members of this court of course have (perhaps be-
cause of the human failings of counsel who write briefs) 
a very complete k.riowledge of the labor involved in 
briefing cases as close and difficult as the Rosenbaum 
case, supra, here involved. We submit they are entitled 
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to haYe and to act upon an opinion as to the unreason-
·ableness of the fee fixed by the Commission in this case. 
In considering- this point we are of course im-
mediately confronted with the divided opinion in the 
Ellis case. In this connection we must confess we think 
that "Jir. Chief Justice Elias Hansen and 1\'Ir. Justice 
Wolfe had the better of it in their dissenting opinions, 
and that, at least on this point, the Ellis case should be 
over-ruled. 
However, there are some very material distin-
guishing factors in the case at bar which, we submit, 
make the Ellis case inapplicable. We shall refer to them 
only briefly. 
First, the $300 fee allowed to stand in the Ellis case 
was 7 .9+ lf0 of the total compensation ( $3781.41) o b-
tained throug·h counsel's efforts, while in the case at 
bar the allowed fee is only 5.2-% of the $7,250.00 award 
obtained thr~ugh counsel's. efforts. (The fig-ures. in 
the Ellis case are based on Chief Justice Hansen's 
statement : $12.12 a week . x 52 weeks x 6 years.) 
The agreed fee of $1000.00 in this case is only 
13.4- lf0 of the $7250.00 benefit obtained, while in the 
Ellis case all members of the Court thought a fee of 
at least $600.00, or nearly 16<J0 should have been allowed. 
Thus, on a percentage basis, the Commission's al-
lowed fee is a full third lower in our case than in the 
Ellis case. The court of course knows that in the case 
of contracts for contingent fees the uncertainty of any 
remuneration is customarily the most heavily weig-hted 
factor considered in arriving at a fair and reasonable 
fee. That is only practical and just. As we have ob-
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served, attorneys must maintain their offices and eat 
if they are to serve their clients and the courts. An 
attorney must expect to lose half or more of his con-
tingent fee cases. So, if clients with colorable claims 
but no money for a retainer are to have acess to the 
courts in accord with the constitutional guarantee, the 
fees in contingent cases must be large enough to carry 
the combined load of cases won and lost. So it is that 
20% to 40lf'0 or even 50% is very generally regarded as 
a fair and reasonable contingent fee, depending on the 
amount involved, the estimate of the chance of recovery, 
the estimated work involved, and other minor factors. 
When plaintiffs accepted employment in the Rosen-
baum case the chances definitely were not good. The 
case already had been lost, with strong statutory pre-
sumptions in favor of the commission's stand. Plain-
tiffs did not know the facts, which had been inadequately 
developed in the Record made without the assistance of 
counsel for the claimant, but with the very able assis-
tance of opposing counsel. It was a very long shot, as 
the divided opinion of this court has since conclusively 
demonstrated. In such a case it is obvious that the 
highest skill and a great deal of work are, and in fact 
were involved. A large sum was at stake. And yet, be-
cause of the widow's lot, and because the general policy 
is in favor of relatively small fees in workmen's com-
pensation cases (though why it should be less than in a 
negligence case against an insured defendant for the 
death of a breadwinner we can't see) the plaintiffs 
agreed to accept only l3.4lf'0 of the benefit achieved, 
and were "cut down" to 5.2%! 
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:Moreover, as the result of the inflation (of which 
the court will take judicial notice) which has had its 
inception since the Ellis decision, the cost of living and 
of maintaining a law-office has increased enormously. 
A recent headline reported the estimate of the federal 
government that liYing costs are up to 171% of the 
1941 cost. Naturally fees for legal services have like-
wise increased. (We eYen recall that the Bar supported 
a measure for the increase of judicial salaries upon 
earnest representations from most reliable sources that 
such increases were absolutely necessary and eminently 
fair.) Law office earnings, although higher, are not 
keeping pace, and the situation is becoming so had that 
the Editorial Board of the American Bar Association 
Journal is with reason concerned over the future quality 
and independence of the Bar. See ''In Behalf of Young 
Lawyers," 34 A.B.A.J. 588 (July, 1948). Now is not 
the time to cut attorneys fees. 
It may be that the work and time involved in the 
Ellis case was greater than that spent in the Rosen-
baum case. The court's opinion seems to lend credence 
to such a claim, inasmuch as two appeals were involved. 
But here the amount of the claim involved was nearly 
twice that involved in the Ellis case and the work was 
substantial. And there three attorneys would have 
testified that 50lf0 was reasonable. 
Surely 13.4% is most reasonable-and 5.2% is 
most unreasonable, as a matter of law, in this case. 
It is so low, in view of the matters within the judicial 
knowledge of the court, that the court should brand 
it as arbitrary and unreasonable, vacate the order of 
the commission and permit plaintiffs and their clients 
to ·carry out the agreement they have made. 
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As to the fourth assignment of error, it is obvious 
that if the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdic-
tion, and pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, and 
ac.ted arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in fix-
ing so low a fee, and in denying plaintiffs any hearing, 
they erred in refusing to correct the order when asked 
to do so on petition for rehearing. 
It is therefore submitted that this court should 
vacate the order of the Industrial Commission fixing 
plaintiffs fees as being entirely outside the authority 
and jurisdiction of the Commission, in view of the un-
constitutionality of section 42-1-81, or, if the Court will 
not do that, it should vacate the order because it was 
entered without due process and is unreasonable, arbi-
trary and capricious, and should fix or suggest a reason-
able fee in accordance with its plenary power over its 
attorneys, and remand the case for proceedings in 
accord with its judgment. 
We do not want to close this brief without saying 
that this proceeding for review of the Commission's 
order was undertaken only as a public service, and at 
the urging of many of our brothers at the bar who are 
genuinely concerned that the meagerness of the fees 
allowed by the Commission and its arbitrary and 
capricious policy and procedure in respect thereto 
hampers and frustrates the· administration of justice, to 
the ultimate great damage of the public and of the in-
stitutions of democracy. We believe it will be obvious 
to the court that even if this proceeding results in pay-
ment of the total amount of the agreed fee, it will not 
be profitable in a monetary way, for the time and effort 
involved in preparing and presenting our position on 
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these novel questions during a very busy time far out-
weigh the possible financial gain. (This is not intended 
to intimate that we would spurn an increased compen-
sation.) \Ve are convinced however, that these ques-
tions are of considerable public moment in Utah, and we 
are happy to serve in an effort to resolve them properly. 
We only hope our efforts will prove helpful to the 
court in its study and deliberations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
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